Natural law is one of the most important aspects of administrative law. Historically, administrative bodies were not obliged to incorporate the principles of natural law in their decisions. However, the principle of procedural fairness was incorporated into the functioning of administrative bodies over the centuries. Hence, in current practice, natural law principles are by and large applicable in the decisions given by administrative bodies as they are considered quasi-judicial bodies.^[1] This is because their decisions often affect the civil rights of individuals. However, there are certain exceptions wherein natural law principles can be excluded from the decisions of administrative bodies. Examples of this are situations of necessity or where a statue expressly dictates the exclusion of principles of natural justice.

It must be noted that this paper foregoes a comparative analysis with jurisdictions such as the UK and USA as normal retirement is considered a form of age-based retirement and termed compulsory retirement in said jurisdictions due to difference in socio-economic conditions.

However, compulsory jurisdiction is very much an alive issue in the realms of Indian service law jurisprudence, hence the following analysis.

The first case of any import to be decided on the issue of whether it is valid to exclude the principles of natural justice from the practice of compulsory retirement was State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269, [“Binapani Dei”]. The respondent, Binapani Dei, a member of the Orissa Medical Service, was compulsorily retired when the state revised her date of birth due to dispute about it, with the respondent claiming one and opponents claiming another earlier date. The High Court of Orissa held the impugned order to be invalid. The apex court too opined that the state was in the wrong as the revision in Binapani Deis date of birth was done without any proper notice. Additionally, she was given no opportunity to present her version to the adjudicating authority before the order regarding her date of birth on which the impugned order was based was passed. The Court summed up in the following fashion.”

“The State has undoubtedly authority to compulsorily retire a public servant who is superannuated. But when that person disputes the claim he must be informed of the case of the State and the evidence in support thereof and he must have a fair opportunity of meeting that case before a decision adverse to him is taken.”^[2]

Subsequently, in Union of India v. Col JN Sinha and Anr, AIR 1971 SC 40, [“Col JN Sinha”]. Binapani Dei was distinguished on the basis of the reason that, while in Binapani Dei, the impugned order took away rights of the petitioner that were pre-existing, compulsory retirement takes away no pre-existing rights thus imposing no civil consequences (thus making it unnecessary to impose principles of natural justice on the process).

Col J.N. Sinha is the first and foremost case that must be studied in any discussion of the concept of compulsory retirement. This is the law of the land with respect to compulsory retirement and laid down all major principles regarding the issue. The facts of this case are as follows. Col J.N. Sinha, an Extra-Assistant Superintendent in the Survey of India Service, was compulsorily retired vide the impugned order dated August 13, 1969, issued by the Ministry of Education and Youth Services.While the High Court accepted the respondent- employees plea, this was overturned in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held the following things. Firstly, it explained the application of the principles of natural justice to statutory provisions. It expounded through Justices J.C. Shah and K.S. Hegde, that-

“If a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically ‘or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read with the concerned provision the principles of natural justice.”^[3]

Secondly, the court held that the application of principles of natural justice in a particular case “depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of the power.” The court also observed that Article 14 of the Constitution was not violated in such a situation. This is because a reasonable distinction was being drawn on the grounds of incompetence. Employees were not being discriminated against at random.

Union of India & State of Andhra Pradesh v. M.E. Reddy, AIR 1980 SC 563, [“M.E. Reddy”]. is a landmark case regarding compulsory retirement and the exclusion of natural justice in the concept of compulsory retirement. This case originated in a writ petition filed by petitioner, M.E. Reddy in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. M.E. Reddy was an IPS officer who was a promotee from the Andhra state police. He was suspended on 11.08.67 pending departmental enquiry into a large number of allegations that had been made against him. The Andhra government then reinstated Mr. Reddy. The Cause of Action for the current case arose when subsequently, in 1975, the government of India acting on the report of the Review Committee (a committee consisted of the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police, Andhra Pradesh) compulsorily retired M.E. Reddy under sub-rule 3 of rule 16 of the All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958 in public interest on the expiry of 3 months notice period from the date of service of order. A Single Judge bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed the compulsory retirement imposed on petitioner M.E. Reddy and a Division Bench confirmed said order. In the current case, the state of Andhra Pradesh as well as the centre appealed against said decision.

In the final judgment, the apex court accepted the sanctity of principles of natural justice. However, it pointed out that in certain cases, the statute excluded the application of said principles. In those cases, it would be wrong for the courts to ignore the legislatures mandate and interpret the provisions any which way they liked by reading into them principles that had been specifically excluded. The court further examined the nature of this right conferred on the state. The right was held to be an absolute right. However, there were certain conditions subject to which the natural justice can be excluded. First and foremost, it must be in the public interest to do so. The authority must form a bonafide opinion that the measure to retire an employee was taken in public interest. The court further explained this by expounding that the principal aim behind compulsorily retiring a government servant is to weed out the dead wood for the system. Certain officers, for reasons either of poor integrity or plain inefficiency, become a burden on the service. Hence, compulsorily retiring them under rules such as Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules or sub-rule 3 of rule 16 of the All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958is a move that balances the individual rights of the retiree (by retiring them at the fag end of their career with full benefits, no punishment and so on) as well as the rights of the state (to maintain a standard of efficiency and initiative in the service). The aim behind the move is not victimization of the person being retired in such a fashion. The court pointed out that an employees right to be in public employment was not an absolute right but a right to hold public employment in consonance with relevant rules. The very basic fact of the matter is that the relevant rules permit this move. Hence, the state did no wrong in ignoring the principles of natural justice in the favour of rules that they were statutorily bound to follow. The court extensively cited the case of Col J.N. Sinha for this purpose. The court also overruled the case of Chief Security Officer, Eastern Railway and Anr. v. Ajoy Chandra Bagchi, (1975) 2 S. L. R. 660, [“Ajoy Chandra Bagchi”].

The honourable court also pointed out that there did exist a safeguard to protect the retiree so it was in fact only exclusion of the statutory principles that the statute in question specified and not of other principles.

“The safety valve of public interest is the most powerful and the strongest safeguard against any abuse or colourable exercise of power under this Rule. Moreover, when the Court is satisfied that the exercise of power under the rule amounts to a colourable exercise of jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide it can always be struck down.“^[4]

Additionally, there was always recourse to the court if the case was one of malafide intention or arbitrariness.

Lastly, the court observed that since no civil consequences resulted in the form of stigma, reduction in pension or allusions of misbehaviour, the principles of natural justice had no place in this scenario. For this, the court relied heavily on the Col J.N. Sinha case. It also substantiated its decision by following the cases of N.V. Puttabhattaas well as State of Assam and Anr. etc. v. Basanta Kumar Das, AIR 1973 SC 1252, [“Basanta Kumar Das”]. These cases pointed out that the retiree was suffering no civil consequences of any kind. No charge of inefficiency or incompetency is brought against the retiree. The benefits earned by the government servant in question are still given to him. Since the aim behind such order is only public interest, there is no intention of punishing the government servant in question. The court also cited the case of Tara Singh etc. etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors, AIR 1975 SC 1487, [“Tara Singh”]. and Mayenghoan Rahamohan Singh v. The Chief Commissioner (Admn.) Manipur and Ors, AIR 1976 SC 2581, [“Mayenghoan Rahamohan Singh”].

The next important decision is that of Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, AIR 1992 SC 1020, [“Baikuntha Nath Das”]. This case, other than upholding Col J.N. Sinha, also directly upheld ME Reddy. It reaffirmed that since there was no punishment or stigma attached to compulsory retirement, there were no civil consequences for the retiree. Consequently, principles of natural justice could be excluded and courts did not have jurisdiction as appellate courts. However, this did not equate to complete exclusion of judicial scrutiny an order which was malafide, vitiated by lack of evidence or arbitrary could still be overturned.

Additionally, in Union of India v. Dulal Dutt, (1993) 2 SCC 179, [“Dulal Dutt”], the apex court reiterated the principle upheld in Col J.N. Sinha and Baikuntha Nath Das and held that the mere fact of an order not being a speaking order could not be used to hold it to be malafide or arbitrary. However, there is confusion regarding this aspect, as despite the aforementioned cases holding that a speaking order was not a requisite, the Supreme Court held the opposite in State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher, AIR 1996 SC SC 1328, [“Kashinath Kher”]. and Sukhdeo v. Commr., Amravati Division, Amravati, (1996) 3 SCC 103, [“Sukhdeo”].

More recent cases have time and again reiterated this position as the original position reiterated in Col J.N. Sinha and followed through in M.E. Reddy has remained the law of the land.

In the case of Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2001) SCC (L&S) 403, [“Bishwanath Singh”], the Supreme Court justified the purpose of compulsory retirement and the resultant exclusion of the principles of natural justice. It pointed out that the very object of compulsory retirement was to weed out inefficient government servants who were impeding the governments work by their inefficiency. However, by compulsorily retiring them, the government did so in a way that no rights that had already accrued to them were disturbed. No civil consequences came about as a reason. The court summed it up so.”

“It was held that the country needs speed, sensitivity, probity, non-irritative public relations and enthusiastic creativity which can be achieved by eliminating the deadwood, the paper-logged and callous.”^[5]

The Delhi High Court in Leela Sharma v. Govt of NCT, (2010) 170 DLT 170, [“Leela Sharma”] also declared that the governments right to retire an employee is absolute as long as it is a bona fide decision. It pointed out that the practice had come with the object of making government services more efficient. It also upheld the decision in M.E. Reddy regarding uncommunicated adverse remarks. The court held that compulsory retirement was a means of maintaining a balance between the interests of an individual government servant as well as public interest.”

“The rule of compulsory retirement has been held to hold the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interest of the public. The rule is intended to enable the Government to energise its machinery and to make it efficient by compulsorily retiring those who, in its opinion, should not be there in public interest.”^[6]

It is seen that the position in M.E. Reddy has been consistently followed over the years. This is in keeping with development of natural law jurisprudence in related fields. It also recognizes that while the government may have a higher burden than a private party, it is also an employer and thus retains the right to remove employees who have become inefficient.

[1] SP Sathe, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 180, (6th edn., 1998).

[2] Para 11, State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269.

[3] Para 8, Union of India v. Col J.N. Sinha and Anr., AIR 1971 SC 40.

[4] Para 12, Chief Security Officer, Eastern Railway and Anr. v. Ajoy Chandra Bagchi, (1975) 2 S. L. R. 660.

[5] Para 12, Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2001)SCC(L&S)403.

[6] Para 11, Leela Sharma v. Govt of NCT, (2010) 170 DLT 170.

“From the beginning the objective of establishing family courts was to provide speedy disposal of cases involving problems faced by women who were traumatized by marriages that had turned bitter.”

-National Commission for Women

The 1980s were a period of great upheaval in the womens movement in India. The infamous Mathura rape case led to a consolidation of womens groups at the national level, with Parliament eventually enacting the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 in response to the outcry. The issue of womens rights stayed very much at the forefront through the decade, with movements around Sati (subsequent to Roop Kanwars immolation), environmental concerns, and the issue of dowry inter alia. The Family Courts Act, 1984 [“1984 Act”] was enacted in this context, and was in keeping with the spirit of the times. The idea was to recognize the difference in the nature of family disputes and ordinary civil suits, and facilitate resolution of the former accordingly. In Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida, 2003 (3) SCR 498, [“Abdul Jaleel”]. the apex court expounded on the underlying principles based on which the 1984 Act was drafted. It opined that the Act brought in an approach which was “radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings”.^[1] Further, it observed that the statute was enacted subsequent to insertion of Order 32A in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 as the Order was unable to bring about palpable change.

The primary positive change brought about by the 1984 Act is the introduction of conciliation in resolution of family disputes. When both parties come before the family court for the first time, they are usually referred to a counselor whose role is to carry out conciliation. In this manner, a non-adversarial procedure has been institutionalized through the 1984 Act. The report of the counselor is granted such importance, that in Perry Kansagara v. Smriti Madan Kansagara, Civil Appeal No. 1694 of 2019, decided on 15th February, 2019. the Supreme Court held that counselors report with respect to interaction with the child can be relied upon to determine custody issues. The counselor attached to the court functions on the basis of rules by the relevant state government of High Court. However, as noted by the National Commission for Women, there is no uniformity in the rules formulated by various states, thus giving rise to the potential of ad hocism.^[2]

S. 9, 1984 Act also enjoins upon Family Courts the duty to make efforts for settlement and assist the parties in this regard. In R Durga Prasad v. Union of India, 1998 DMC 45, [“R Durga Prasad”]. it was observed by the Jharkhand High Court that this is a mandatory duty that is cast upon courts and case should only be posted for further steps if it is concluded that such settlement is impossible. Further, in K Srinivas Rao v. DA Deepa, AIR 2013 SC 2176, [“K Srinivas Rao”], the apex court dictated that under S. 9, mediation can be referred to (with parties consent) even if a failure report is submitted in the conciliation process. The above provision and its judicial interpretation aptly illustrate the renewed spirit that the 1984 Act has brought in the resolution of family disputes.”

It must be noted that rather than being a new substantive law, the 1984 Act is a new procedural approach for application of pre-existing substantive laws. Apart from the above procedural flexibilities, Family Courts have also been provided flexibility vis-a-vis evidentiary provisions. Further, civil and criminal jurisidiction have both been vested in such courts to enable resolution of all connected matters in a family dispute. Apart from purely legal aspects, Family courts also represent a step forward in accounting for the human angle in family disputes. For instance, the Childrens Complex set up in the Mumbai Family Court provides a comfortable environment for the child and the non-custodial parent to carry out meetings. This is unlike the traditional setup wherein parents are forced to meet their children for a brief duration in hostile courtrooms.

A significant innovation is the inclusion of suits with respect to property between parties to a marriage, as provided in Expl (c), S. 7, 1984 Act. This ensures an expeditious method for resolution of property disputes which arise in the context of marriage.

The relevance of Family Courts has now increased in light of an increased divorce rate in Indian society. A Family Court can be set up in any city or town whose population exceeds one million. As urbanization and an increased population have led to growth in residents of towns and cities, the potential areas for establishment of Family Courts have increased manifold. The state of Haryana recently decided to set up Family Courts in seven more districts, a reflection of the increasing importance of such courts.

In light of the above situation, there are certain emerging issues vis-a-vis Family Courts which require a closer analysis.

Firstly, the issue of privacy is a pressing one. Right to privacy is now included within the ambit of Article 21, as per the judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2018 (12) SCALE 1, [“Puttaswamy”]. This right could potentially be in conflict with the evidence presented in family courts, as it is often of a sensitive and private nature. For instance, subsequent to Puttaswamy, a family court in Delhi held that a recording of a private telephonic conversation is admissible in a Family Court even though it was collected by planting a recorder in the bedroom i.e. in clear breach of the right to privacy. The honorable Judge observed that consequences of violation on inadmissibility of evidence have not been discussed in Puttaswamy, thus enabling him to permit admissal of such evidence. Also relevant here are the 2015 guidelines with respect to privacy in family matters issued by the Delhi High Court.^[3] Herein, the court gave directions to ensure protection of information of a private nature even prior to the holding in Puttaswamy. This issue is being given conflicting interpretations by courts across the country and deserves dedicated attention of our higher judiciary.”

Secondly, there is the issue of inclusion of Domestic Violence proceedings in the jurisdiction of Family Courts. The jurisdiction clause i.e. S. 7 of the 1984 Act does not include proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [“DV Act”]. However, S. 26 of the DV Act enables parties to seek relief before a Family Court. In light of the above, the Bombay High Court in Ambreen Akhoon v. Aditya Paudwal, 2017 (3) RCR (Civil) 645, [“Ambreen Akhoon”]. held that even relatives of the husband can be made party to proceedings before Family Courts if they are under S. 26, DV Act even though they are not parties to the marriage. This beneficial interpretation seeks to widen the ambit of jurisdiction of Family Courts and must form a model for legislative inclusion of domestic violence under the 1984 Act.

It has been seen that Family Courts have been an innovative addition to the Indian judicial system. However, emerging grey areas must be resolved to ensure their continued efficacy.

[1] Para 13, supra note 1.

[2] National Commission for Women, Report on Working of Family Courts and Model Family Courts, (Mar. 2002), available at http://ncw.nic.in/sites/default/files/Working%20of%20Family%20courts%20in%20India.pdf (last visited on February 26, 2019).

[3] Order on June 11, 2016 in Mat. App. (F.C.) 78 of 2015 & CM APP No. 11008 of 2015, Del HC.

The 1990s brought liberalization to India, and with it came a docket explosion crisis, the ramifications of which we are still dealing with. S. 89 was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure through its 1999 Amendment Act,^[1] based on the recommendations of the Malimath Committee report and the 129thLaw Commission Report, in response to this crisis. The aim was to increase access to justice through reducing costs and pendency.^[2] A specific provision was required as litigantsdid not refer to these much when left to their own devices due to reasons such as ignorance, reluctance or indifference.^[3]

In light of the above, S. 89, CPC enables courts to determine whether a matter can be resolved through ADR. It provides for reference to arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (may also be brought about through a Lok Adalat) and mediation. Eliciting parties’ consent on the method of dispute resolution to be adopted is preferred but not necessary.^[4]

The effect of referring a dispute to each of these methods is different. For example, a case can only be referred to arbitration if both parties consent to it. Once it is so referred, it goes “outside the stream of the court”^[5] and is decided finally by the arbitral tribunal itself, based on the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“AC Act”].^[6] On the other hand, a mediation settlement will have to be confirmed by the court. While the scheme of the section is fairly simple prima facie, lacunae in drafting have created some complications.^[7]

Deliberation on Section 89, CPC was initiated in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, 2003 (1) SCC 49.. The constitutional validity of the section was upheld and the intent behind its inclusion lauded. Criticism was muted as S. 89, CPC was a recent insertion at the time. It was opined that the section had not been very effective as its modalities were yet to be determined. A committee was set up to draft model rules, and the apex court recommended the adoption of these rules by the various High Courts so as to give effect to section 89(2)(d), CPC.

In the subsequent decision of Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344, [“Salem II”] the apex court purposively reinterpreted S. 89, CPC to reduce anomalies. For instance, the words shall and may in S. 89, CPC and Rules IA-IC, Order X, CPC were read harmoniously and it was determined that may was intended to refer to only the reformulation of terms of a potential settlement by the court. There was also an attempt to resolve the issue created by inclusion of the phrase “terms of settlement” in the section. The section mandates formulation of settlement at the pleadings stages. However, this is not feasible since, firstly, there would not have been adequate application of mind of the judge at the pleadings stage, and, secondly, determining terms of settlement is the domain of the ADR forum. So, a plain reading of the section creates the futile situation wherein courts are expected to do the ADR forums job before referring a matter to it. In light of the above, “terms of settlement” was interpreted as summary of disputes.

The court further replaced the definition of mediation in the section with that suggested in the model mediation rules.

The subsequent decision in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co (P) Ltd , 2010 8 SCC 24, [“Afcons case”]. is the most recent landmark judgement on the issue. The primary issue herein was whether the court could refer a case to arbitration without the consent of both parties. However, there was also an extensive discussion on the scope of S. 89, CPC. It was noted that the language of S. 89(1), CPC is borrowed entirely from S. 73(1), AC Act which is in reference to a conciliator in the final stages of conciliation and hence unsuitable vis-a-vis a court of law referring disputes to be resolved through an ADR method. Thus, the phrase “terms of settlement” was interpreted in light of the decision in Salem II.

The mix-up between the terms judicial settlement and mediation in sub clauses (c) and (d) of S. 89(2) CPC was recognized as a drafting error. It was also opined that a matter referred to a Lok Adalat under section 89 would be different from a matter taken to a Lok Adalat independently as the former would still need to be placed before the court subsequent to the Lok Adalat passing its award. However, this aspect of the judgment has been subsequently disputed due to the fact that it is in conflict with section 21, LSA Act.^{[8] [9]}

Beyond Supreme Court judgments, further confusion exists section 89(2)(c) and 89(2)(d) even if the words mediation and judicial settlement are switched as in that case, a mediation agreement will get the same status as one reached through a Lok Adalat. However, as per S. 21, Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 [“LSA Act”], an award passed by a Lok Adalat is given the same status as a decree passed by a civil court, while a mediation agreement has to be confirmed by court.^[10]” Another strand of opposition exists in the form of those who opine that the distinction between mediation and conciliation is a false one and hence there is no need for a separate mediation clause.^[11]” The Law Commission of India has even recommended the deletion of the provision for mediation under section 89(1) because that is an option that is always open to the court anyway, leaving no need or reason to codify it.^[12]”

The issue vis-a-vis court fees which has arisen in light of S. 16, Court Fees Act, 1870^[13] must also be resolved. The intent behind the section is to avoid penalizing litigants who choose ADR, and also incentivizing them, by ensuring a refund of court fees. However, a plain reading of the section itself gives rise to a problem. Section 89, CPC is supposed to be a mandatory provision if the court feels that there is a chance of settlement. So, cases are referred for ADR mandatorily. That does not always translate into a settlement taking place between the parties. If such a thing happens in case of mediation, conciliation or Lok Adalats, then parties can come back to court. Nonetheless, in this case, they would have been refunded their court fee so they would have their case tried for free.^[14] In Nutan Batra v. Buniyaad Associates, 2018 SCC Online Del 12916., the Delhi High Court clarified that S. 16, Court Fees Act must not be given a literal interpretation which would entitle a plaintiff to refund irrespective of successful settlement through ADR methods.

Despite the above criticisms, it cannot be denied that S. 89, CPC is an admirable attempt to reduce the burden on courts^[15] and make justice a reality for litigants. The model that it attempts to replicate has been very successful in various jurisdictions. California is a very successful example of this with no arrears of cases older than two years. In fact, in San Diego, 97% of all civil cases are settled through methods of ADR.^[16] Further, the section has facilitated the increased use of ADR methods by parties to legal disputes. For instance, there is an increased trend of mediation in matrimonial disputes. Such avenues are also being preferred by parties who prefer confidentiality.^[17] Further, implementation has become more practicable in light of the apex courts interpretation of the section, thus ensuring an overall positive impact. In brief, section 89 is an attempt at innovative legislation to solve a problem that is plaguing the Indian legal system and is only set to become bigger in the coming years. One can then safely surmise that the idea behind section 89, CPC is one that is not only laudable it is also desperately needed.

[1] Rules 1A-1C, CPC And Section 16, Court Fees Act, 1870 [“Court Fees Act”] were incorporated along with Section 89 and are intended to be read together; MULLA ON THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol 1, 874, (BM Prasad ed., 18th edn., 2011).

[2] MP Jain, THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 251, (2004).

[3] R.V. Raveendran, Section 89 CPC: Need For An Urgent Relook, SCC(J) 2007 (4) 23, 23.

[4] 238th Report of the Law Commission of India, Amendment of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Allied Provisions, 10, 2011.

[5] Para 9, Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, 2003 (1) SCC 49.

[6] 176th Report of the Law Commission of India, The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2001, 32, 2001.

[7] It has been described as “not very happily worded” and having been “drafted in a hurry”; supra note 3, at 24.

[8] Supra note 4, at 19.

[9] The section provides that a Lok Adalats award will be deemed to be the decree of a civil court.

[10] Supra note 4, at 19.

[11] Supra note 3, at 23.

[12] 163rd Report of the Law Commission of India, The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1997, 21, 1998. However, there have not been too many takers for this particular point of view.

[13] This section is not in effect in all states as many of them have their own Court Fees Act. A lot of these state acts do not have a corresponding provision; supra note 3, at 30.]

[14] Supra note 3, at 24.

[15] A Xavier, Mediation: Its Origin and Growth in India, 27(2), HAMLINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY, 275, 281, (2006).

[16] Justice MS Shah, Study of the American Legal System for Procedural Reforms in Civil Courts in India, available at http://gujarathighcourt.nic.in/mediation/study1.htm.

[17] BS Hanasi, A Critical Study of the Alternate Dispute Resolution System in India (with special focus on Lok Adalats), 222, 2008.